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Notes
"Captive Audience" Meetings in Union
Organizing Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair
Advantage?
ELIZABETH J. MASSON*

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' protects the collective
bargaining rights of most private sector workers in the United States.'
Under the NLRA, employees3 have the right to form, join, and assist
unions, and to bargain collectively with their employers, through
representatives of their own choosing.' The NLRA also prohibits
employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
their exercise of these rights.5 Protecting employees' rights, and thereby
encouraging the practice of collective bargaining between employers and
employees, is declared by the NLRA to be the policy of the United
States.
Today, less than ten percent of private sector employees in the
United States are represented by a union.' Low union density is
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005. I would like to
thank Professor Reuel Schiller for sharing his knowledge and passion for labor law. I would also like
to thank Judge William L. Schmidt for his wisdom, encouragement, and friendship.
i. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
2. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COLLECIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS: INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF

WORKERS wrni

AND wrrour BARGAINING RIGHTs, Report to Congressional Requesters U.S. Senate, 2
(Report No. GAO-02-835) (Sept. 2002).
3. Section 152(3) of the NLRA defines the "employees" who are covered under the Act. 29
U.S.C. § 152(3). This definition excludes agricultural laborers, private domestic workers, independent
contractors, statutorily-defined supervisors, workers covered by the Railway Labor Act, and
governmental workers. Id. §§ i5i-i69.
4- Id. § 157.
5. Id. § I58(a)(i).

6. Id. §15.
7. BUREAU

OF LABOR STA-nsTcS REPORT: UNION MEMBERS IN
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/union2.txt at tbl.3, (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).

[169]

2003,

available at
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attributable to several factors, including the intensity of employer
resistance encountered by employees attempting to unionize a non-union
workplace.8 A common and legal tactic used by employers in their efforts
to fight unionization is the "captive audience" meeting.9 Employers
assemble employees, usually during work time, and present them with
anti-union speeches and videos.'" Employers can fire employees for not
attending a captive audience meeting, or for asking a question during the
meeting."
Although captive audience meetings were unlawful during the
twelve years following the enactment of the NLRA,'2 they are now legal
and highly effective weapons used by employers to dissuade employees
from electing a union. This Note will argue that captive audience
meetings should be prohibited under the NLRA because they constitute
employer interference in employees' free choice in union elections.
Part I will examine the current state of the law and its effect on
union organizing campaigns. Part II will trace the changes in the law and
national labor policy that led to the legalization of captive audience
meetings. Part III will analyze the conflict between the legal doctrine
used to sanction captive audience meetings and both the statutory goal of
protecting employee rights, and the basic policy assumptions underlying
the NLRA. Part III will also examine the flawed presumptions
underlying the concept that employer participation in union organizing
campaigns is necessary.
Part IV will argue for a change in current law governing union
representation elections, to ban the use of captive audience meetings
throughout the pre-election time period. Part IV will discuss four bases
of support for this proposal: I) banning captive audience meetings
requires merely an extension of current law, which prohibits captive
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKER'S FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, at 8-1o (2ooo), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2ooo/uslabor/; DR. KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACT OF
CAPITAL MOBILITY ON WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING (SUBMITTED TO THE U.S. TRADE
DEFICIT REVIEW COMMISSION) II (2000); AFL-CIO ISSUE BRIEF, THE SILENT WAR: THE ASSAULT ON
WORKERS' FREEDOM TO CHOOSE A UNION AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2002).

9. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 8, at 73 tbl.8.
To. AFL-CIO ISSuE BRIEF, supra note 8, at 4-5.
ii.NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. CO., 500 F.2d 6, II (8th Cir. 1974) (upholding employer's
discharge of employee who attempted to ask questions during an anti-union captive audience
meeting); Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. io24, io3o (1968) (holding employees have no statutorilyprotected right to leave meetings which they are required by management to attend on company time
and property in order to hear anti-union speeches designed to influence the outcome of union
election); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 8, at 57.
12. In re Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 70 N.L.RB. 802, 8o5 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir.
1947) (finding employer's exercise of superior economic power in coercing its employees to listen to
speeches related to their organizational activities to be an independent violation of Section 8(1) of the
NLRA).
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audience meetings during the twenty-four hours prior to a representation
election; 2) banning captive audience meetings would not require
employers to grant unions equal access to employees, which courts and
employers have resisted for sixty years; 3) banning captive audience
meetings would regulate employer speech in accordance with the First
Amendment "captive-audience" doctrine; and 4) most industrialized
democracies, and several individual states, have recognized captive
audience meetings as inherently coercive and banned their use in
representation elections.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Although 77 percent of workers in the United States have collective
bargaining rights under the NLRA, union density in the private sector is
at an all time low. 3 Union membership as a percentage of the workforce
has declined in the United States since the mid-195Os, when it peaked at
more than 30 percent,' 4 to 9 percent in 2003." Yet 44 percent of
unorganized private-sector employees report they would like to be
represented by a union. 6 This figure represents as many as 42 million
U.S. workers who have not benefited from the statutory right to join a
labor organization.'7
In 1997, employees successfully elected unions in only 48 percent of
certification elections held by the National Labor Relations Board
(Board).' Many scholars and researchers attribute the disparity between
workers who want unions, and workers who successfully elect unions to
intense employer opposition to union organizing.' 9
A. CAYnvE AUDIENCE MEETINGS AS EMPLOYER RESISTANCE TACTIC
One of the most common anti-union tactics used by employers is the
holding of "captive audience" meetings." A captive audience meeting is
an anti-union meeting held on company time, at which worker
attendance is mandatory, and which workers can be fired for refusing to
attend. Workers can also be prohibited from asking questions or
speaking during the meeting, upon pain of discipline, including

13. BuREAu OF LABOR STATSnCS REPORT, supranote 7, at tbl.3.
14. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 8, at 7 n.117 (2000).
15. BuREAu OF LABOR STATSnCS REPORT, supranote 7, at tbl.37.
I6. RICHARD B. FREEMAN &JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 89 (I999).
17. AFL-CIO, Employer Interference-By the Numbers, available at http//www.aflcio.org/

abouttnions/joinunions/howjoin/employerinterference.cfm (last visited Oct. i6, 2004).
I8. John Logan, Representatives of Their Own Choosing?: Certification, Elections, and Employer
FreeSpeech, 1935-1959, 23 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 549, 549 (2000).
i
See sources cited supra note 8.
20. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 8, at 73 tbl.8.
21. See sources cited supra note I I.
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discharge."
Employers held anti-union captive audience meetings in 92 percent
of more than 400 union elections held by the National Labor Relations
Board between January 1998 and December 1999.3 On average,
employers held eleven anti-union captive audience meetings in the time
period prior to the Board election.' Union win rates declined
dramatically as the number of captive audience meetings increased, from
more than 40 percent when no captive audience meetings were held, to
I8 percent when the employer held twenty or more. 5
Employers hire anti-union labor consultants in 71 percent of Board
elections 6 These consultants encourage employers to use their virtually
unlimited opportunities to communicate aggressively with their
employees during union campaigns. 7 The Department of Labor (DOL)
has documented the proliferation of anti-union consulting and legal
firms." The DOL admits, however, that an accurate estimate of the
amount of money employers spend on anti-union consultants and
lawyers is not available under current law.29
B.

ACTUAL EMPLOYER COST TO DEFEAT UNIONIZATION UNKNOWN

In 1959, Congress passed the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA). ° Section 203 of the LMRDA requires that
employers report the amount of money they spend on certain anti-union
consultant activities to the government.3 In passing the LMIRDA,
Congress declared that tactics used by employers to defeat unionization
should be exposed to public view, in order to protect the free exercise of
employees' rights.3" The LMRDA, however, provides an exemption from
the reporting requirements for payments covering services that constitute
"advice," which the employer is free to accept or reject.33 As long as an
anti-union consultant does not speak directly to an employer's workers,
its services can be categorized as "advice."' This exemption allows
22.

See sources cited supra note 8.

23. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 8, at 73 tbl.8.
24. Id.
25. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract
Campaigns: Implicationsfor Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
75, 80-82 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Department of Labor Notice of Revised Statutory Interpretation, 66 Fed. Reg. 2782 (Jan. I1,
2001).

29. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 433(b).

S.REP. No. 86-187, at 9 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.AN. 2318, 2327.
33- 29 U.S.C. § 433(c).
34. Department of Labor Notice of Revised Statutory Interpretation, supra note 28.
32.
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employers and anti-union consultants to circumvent the reporting
requirements of the LMRDA, and avoid the scrutiny of the Department
of Labor, and the public.3" In January 2001, the Department of Labor
revised its interpretation of the "advice" exemption in an attempt to
remedy the underreporting of anti-union activities by employers and
their consultants. 6 In April 2001, the Bush administration rescinded the
Department of Labor's revised interpretation of the LMRDA's "advice"
exemption.'
NLRA
Although the magnitude of the anti-union consulting industry
supported by employer resistance to unionization is unknown,
lawmakers have recognized its effects as problematic. In November 2003,
Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative George Miller introduced
legislation aimed at counterinF the negative effects of employer
resistance to union organization.3 The bill, known as the Employee Free
Choice Act,39 would amend the NLRA to allow a union to be certified as
the employees' representative when a majority of employees have signed
union authorization cards.' Currently, even if a majority of employees
have signed union authorization cards, the employer can refuse to
recognize the union as the employees' representative, and insist on a
Board-held election.' Employers routinely require elections in order to
engage in a campaign against the unionY Witnesses testifying at a House
subcommittee hearing on the Employee Free Choice Act cited preelection captive audience meetings as the type of employer coercion that
intimidates employees and has a chilling effect on the workers'
organizing campaign. 3 While the bill is not currently scheduled for a
vote, Representative Charles Norwood has introduced a bill in
opposition to the Employee Free Choice Act, which would prohibit
employers from recognizing unions through "card checks."'
C.

LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN 2003 TO REFORM THE

35- Id.
36. Id. (reinterpreting "advice" exemption to exclude consultant-prepared materials, the object of
which is to persuade employees to vote against union representation).
37. Department of Labor Notice of Rescission of Revised Statutory Interpretation, 66 Fed. Reg.
38,864 (Apr. II, 2oo0).
38. BNA Daily Labor Report, Kennedy, Miller Unveil Measure To Allow Card Check
Recognition, Nov. i4,2oo3.

39.
4o.
41.
42.

H.R. 3619, io8th Cong. (2003); S. 1925, io8th Cong. (2003).
BNA Daily Labor Report, supranote 38.
Id.
BNA Daily Labor Report, AFL-CIO Seeking 'Special Emphasis' On Card Check Bill In

Endorsements, June 7, 2004.

43. BNA Daily Labor Report, Witnesses at House Hearing Discuss Merits of Elections Versus
Card-Check Recognition, Apr. 23, 2004; BNA Daily Labor Report, Bonior Calls for Labor Law
Reform to Fix Problems in Organizing Drives, Mar. 11,2004.
44. HR. 4343, io8th Cong. (2004).
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The Employee Free Choice Act has 207 co-sponsors in the House of

Representatives, and 32 in the Senate,45 which signifies a widespread
concern for strengthening employees' rights under the NLRA.
Regardless of whether Congress passes the Employee Free Choice Act,
banning captive audience meetings would limit employers' ability to use

the pre-election time period to infringe upon employees' rights.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETINGS

NLRA
The National Labor Relations Act, also known as the Wagner Act
(for its leading proponent, Senator Robert Wagner) was passed in 1935
amidst "more sustained opposition than any other proposal made during
the early years of the New Deal Administration." 6 The Wagner Act
codified the democratic principles of worker self-organization and
election of collective bargaining representatives without interference
from management.47 Section i of the NLRA states that the denial by
some employers of the right of employees to organize and engage in
collective bargaining leads to industrial strife and the diminution of
employment and wages." Section i further states that the inequality of
bargaining power between at-will employees and employers substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce.49 Congress found that this
disparity in bargaining power also aggravates economic depression
symptoms, depresses wages, and lowers purchasing power of wage
earners." Section i declares the policy of the United States to be to
encourage collective bargaining, and to protect the rights of workers to
form and join unions, and to bargain collectively in negotiating their
terms and conditions of employment."
The Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board" to
enforce the provisions of the NLRA. The Board's two main tasks are
overseeing representational elections and remedying unfair labor
practices.53 The unfair labor practices proscribed in Section 8(a)(i)
through Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA are designed to prevent employers
from infringing upon employees' rights.' Section 8(a)(i) prohibits an
THE

45. See www.senate.gov, last visited Dec. 17, 2004.
46. JAMEs A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN
ECONOMICS, POLmCS AND THE LAW, VOL. I (1933-1937) 4 (1974).
47. Id.
48. 29 U.S.C. § I51 (2000).
49. Id.
5o. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 153.
53. Id. §§ 153, i6o.
54. RICHARD N. BLOCK ET AL., LABOR LAw, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND EMPLOYEE CHOICE: THE
STATE OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE 199OS: HEARINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
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employer from interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the NLRA."
As the early Board interpreted the Wagner Act, employers were not
to be involved in employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights, based on
the principle that the employer's participation in the process of
unionization was inherently coercive, given the employees' economic
dependence on the employer. 6 The Board's goal of employer neutrality
was further supported by a principle espoused by Dr. Paul H. Douglas,
an economics professor at the University of Chicago, during the Senate
Committee hearings preceding the passage of the NLRA. Dr. Douglas
stated that, under the Wagner Act, employers should not directly or
indirectly make or influence the choice of their workers."
It is to be the workers who will make the choice. This is only fair, since
the law has long since recognized that a man should not serve adverse
The employer,
interests or represent both the buyer and the seller ....
or the buyer of labor, can choose his own bargaining agency, but he is
not to help the worker, or the seller of labor, to choose his.'
I. 1935: Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines
The Board's first decision, In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
involved an employer who warned his employees not to join a union, at
the same time he created an internal employee association. 9 The Board
found that the "advice" the employer gave his employees not to join the
"outside" union was motivated by a desire to keep the employees from
joining a union of their own choosing. 6° Such "advice," when offered by
an employer who can fire the employee to whom the "advice" is given,
interfered with, restrained, and coerced the employees from exercising
their rights. 6' The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Board's order to
disestablish the employer-dominated association without commenting on
the Board's finding that the employer's "advice" violated the NLRA.
r94o-1941: Virginia Electric & Power Co.
2.
Another early Board decision enforcing employer neutrality in the
face of employees exercising their rights was reversed by the federal
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, 1993-94, at 15 (1996).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-I69 (2000), § i58(a)(i).

56. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 54, at I6.
57. Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm on Educ. and Labor, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1935, at
239 (statement of Dr. Paul H. Douglas, Authority on Labor Problems, Prof. of Econ., Univ. of
Chicago).
58. Id.
59. I N.L.R.B. 1, 22-23 (1935), enforced as modified, 91 F.2d 178, 178 (3d Cir. 1937), reversed on
othergrounds, 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
6o. IN.L.R.B. at 23.
6i. Id.
62. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1938).
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appeals court. 63 In In re Virginia Electric & Power Co., the Board held
that an employer's speeches and written bulletins, urging employees not
to join a union, but instead to join an employer-dominated association,
interfered with the employees' rights under the NLRA.6, The Fourth
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order,65 and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed. 66 The Court held that the Board lacked a sufficient basis
for finding that the employer's anti-union speeches and literature
interfered with, coerced, or restrained employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights -6' In reversing and remanding the case, the Court noted
that nothing in the NLRA prohibited the employer from expressing his
view on labor policies or problems, but that he was "as free now as ever
to take any side [he] may choose on this controversial issue.'' 6 Coming
just six years after the NLRA's enactment, the Court's holding was in
stark contradiction to Congress' declared national labor policy of
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining as
essential for a free and democratic society. Section i of the NLRA
purportedly resolved any controversy on the issue soundly in favor of
promoting employees' self-organization.69 Virginia Electric Co. marked a
watershed in labor law under the NLRA, in signaling that employers
need not remain neutral during the union election process.7'
3. 1942-1943: American Tube Bending
The following year, in In re American Tube Bending Co., Inc., the
Board held that an employer violated the Act by interfering with the
Board-held representation election.7' Prior to the election, the employer
gave captive audience speeches and sent letters to its employees, in an72
effort to persuade employees not to vote for either union on the ballot.
Somewhat reluctantly, the Second Circuit followed Virginia Electric Co.
and denied enforcement of the Board's order.' Judge Learned Hand
stated that, prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Virginia Electric, the
court might have upheld the Board's order directing the employer not to
interfere with or coerce its employees in the exercise of their Section 7
63.

BLOCK ET AL., supra note 54, at 16.
64. 20 N.L.R.B. 911, 919-25 (940).
65. 115 F.2d 414, 423 (4 th Cir. i94o).

66. 314 U.S. 469,48o (i94).
67. Id. at 479.
68. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2ooo) (declaring national labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining);
James A. Gross, The Demise of the National LaborPolicy: A Question of Social Justice, inRPSTORING
THE PRONUSE OF AamcN
LABOR LAw, supra note 25, at 45, 46 (describing Wagner Act as based on
the principle that the "rights of workers to participate in decisions affecting their workplace lives was
considered an essential component of social justice").
70. BLOCK Er AL., supra note 54, at 17.

71. 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 134 (1942).
72. Id. at 129-30.
73. 134 F.2d 993, 995 (2d Cir. 1943).
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rights.74 According to Judge Hand, the court could have interpreted
earlier Board decisions to hold that any expression of such views by an
employer directly to his employees could be construed as coercive, and
possibly threatening to "those... whom he does not succeed in
convincing."'75 The court, however, found little to distinguish the antiunion conduct of the employer in American Tube Bending from that of
Electric & Power Co., and declined to enforce
the employer in Virginia
76
the Board's order.
4. 1946-1947."Clark Bros.
In 1946, the Board ruled in In re Clark Bros.' that the employer's
anti-union captive audience speeches were calculated to, and succeeded
in interfering with the employees' selection of a representative of their
choice. 78 The Board stated that the freedoms guaranteed by Section 7
were meaningless unless employees were also free to choose whether or
not to receive advice, aid, or assistance concerning their rights. 9 The
employer in Clark Bros. used its economic power to force its speech on
unwilling listeners, rendering its speech unlawful. 8° The Board compared
captive audience speeches to the act of a person who physically restrains
his listeners to assure their attention.I The Board wrote: "The law may
and does prevent such a use of force without denying the right to
speak."'"
In finding the captive audience speeches to be an unfair labor
practice, the Board reasoned that:
[Tihe words or conduct of an employer.., must be judged not as an
abstract proposition but realistically in the light of the economic
relationship between the employer and his employees. It need hardly
be stressed that their economic dependence renders employees unduly
responsive to the suggestions of their employer, whose good will is so
necessary, and gives to the employer's statements... an immediate
and compelling effect that they would not possess if they were
addressed to economic equals."
The Second Circuit upheld the Board's order.84 The court stated that
the constitutional guarantee of free speech entitles an employer to
express his views on labor relations, so long as his conduct as a whole is

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
8o.
8i.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 994.
Id.
Id. at 995.
In re Clark Bros. Co. Inc., 70 N.L.RB.
70 N.L.R.B. at 8o 5 .
Id.

802,

(1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 373, 376

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 826.
NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 163 F.2d 373,376 (2d Or. 1947).

(2d Cir. 1947).
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not coercive. 85 In Clark Bros., the employer's holding of captive audience
meetings was coercive and interfered with the employee's rights, despite
the generally unobjectionable content of the employer's speech. 86 The
court held that, given the circumstances of the employer's aggressive
anti-union campaign, the Board was justified in finding the captive
audience meetings violated the Act. 7 However, the court rejected the
Board's argument that employees' rights were infringed upon whenever
an employer used its power to compel their attendance at anti-union
meetings. The court declined to hold that employers may never hold
captive audience meetings; such meetings would not violate the NLRA,
provided union representatives
were accorded a similar opportunity to
89
address employees.
B. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AMENDED NLRA
In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), ° better known as the Taft-Hartley Act, a substantial
amendment to the NLRA. The LMRA added Section 8(c) to the NLRA,
which provides that "[t]he expressing of any views, argument or
opinion... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit." 9 Section 8(c) became known as the "employer free
speech" provision.92 In passing the LMRA, the Senate declared its
intention to overrule Board decisions such as Clark Bros., which the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare considered to be "too
restrictive" of employers' rights.' 3
The following year, the Board ruled in In re Babcock & Wilcox' that
Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act extinguished the "compulsory
audience" doctrine espoused by the Board in Clark Bros. as a basis for
finding an unfair labor practice.'
Subsequently, the Board attempted to restrict rather than to prohibit
employers' use of captive audience speeches; however, the Second

85. Id.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

9o . Pub. L. No. 47-I1,

6i Stat. 136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-i69).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
92. H.R. REP.No. 80-245, at 6 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 292, 297 (1948).

93. S. REP.No. 8o-105, at 23-24 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Act, 1947, at 4o7, 429-30 (1948).
94. 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
95. Id. at 578.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
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Circuit overruled the Board's decision. In In re Bonwit Teller, 6 the
employer enforced a broad no-solicitation rule, which prohibited
employees from discussing unionization in working areas, and kept union
organizers from accessing employees.' Prior to a Board-held election,
the employer locked all employees inside the store to compel their
attendance at an anti-union meeting, and even physically restrained
employees who attempted to leave the store.8 The employer also ignored
the union's request for permission to address the employees at the
store.' The Board held that, given the employer's broad no-solicitation
rule, denying the union's request to address the employees had made a
fair election impossible.' ° The anti-union captive audience meetings,
combined with the employer' refusal to allow the union to access the
employees during working hours, interfered with the employees' rights in
violation of the NLRA.'°'
The Second Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order that the
employer either cease making captive audience speeches or allow the
union an equal opportunity to address employees."° The court found that
such an order was too broad, and held instead that the employer must
cease discriminatorily applying its no-solicitation rule, thereby affording
the union some avenue of communication with employees."
C.

CuRRENT LAW: PEERLESS PLYWOOD RULE ISSOLE LIMITATION ON

CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETINGS
In 1953, the Board issued a pair of companion cases, In re Livingston

Shirt Corp."°4 and In re Peerless Plywood Co.,"° that overruled Bonwit
Teller and established a single limitation on captive audience meetings.
In Livingston Shirt the Board found that "Bonwit Teller was the
discredited Clark Bros. doctrine in scant disguise. "'6 The Board held that
requiring an employer to allow the union equal opportunity to address
employees at their workplace, on work time, impermissibly violated
employers' property rights.""
Peerless Plywood established the rule that captive audience meetings
may be held, by either the employer or the union, except within the last
96. 96 N.L.R.B. 6o8 (i95i), enforced in part, i97 F.2d 640
97. 96 N.L.R.B. at 61I.
98. Id. at 622.
99. Id.at 632.
oo. Id. at 613.
ioi. Id. at 615.
102. 197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cii. 1952).

io3. Id.
104. io7 N.L.RtB. 400 (1953).
105. IO7 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
io6. io7 N.L.RB. at 407.
i7. Id. at 406-o7.

(2d Cir. 1952).
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twenty-four hours before the scheduled time for conducting an
election."' The Board found in Peerless Plywood that a captive audience
speech given within the last twenty-four hours before an election tends to
create a "mass psychology" that overrides arguments made through
other campaign media, and gives an unfair advantage to the party having
the "last word."'" In Livingston Shirt, the Board referred to this rule as
an attempt to protect employees, "whose rights are after all paramount,"
from last-minute arguments they "may be compelled to hear.""...
Although the rule ostensibly applies to both employers and unions,
Livingston Shirt made clear that only the employer has the right to
compel employees to hear any speech, through economic coercion."
Because employers are never required to allow unions to address
employees on the employer's premises, unions do not hold "captive
audience" meetings and the Peerless Plywood rule does not affect
unions.
By the I97os, employers had obtained the right to keep union
organizers off their property and had almost total control over the
organizing campaign in the workplace." 2 By the end of the I98os, the
nature of labor relations in the U.S. had fundamentally shifted from any
vestige of protecting the freedoms guaranteed to workers by the NLRA,
to a new emphasis on preventing or eliminating collective bargaining."3
III.
A.

CAPTIvE AUDIENCE MEETINGS ARE INHARMONIOUS WITH AND
UNNECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS' RIGHTS

CAPTIvE AUDIENCE MEETINGS CONFLICT WITH THE POLICY GOALS OF
THE NLRA

The "free speech" doctrine that the Board and courts used to
legalize captive audience meetings is in deep conflict with the goals of the
NLRA. Section i of the NLRA expresses the statutory purpose of
equalizing bargaining power between employer and employees."4 The
NLRA was intended to enable workers to obtain power so that respect
for their rights and interests was not dependent solely on the interests of
their employers or the state."'
io8.
to9.
iio.
iii.

io7 N.L.R.B. at 429.
Id.
io 7 N.L.R.B. at 408 (emphasis added).
See id. at 405-06.
112. BLOCK ET A., supra note 54, at i8.
113. Phil Comstock & Maier B. Fox, Employer Tactics and Labor Law Reform, in
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw, supra note 25, at 90, 91.

RESTORING THE

114. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (20OO).
115. James A. Gross, Worker's Rights as Human Rights: Wagner Act Values and Moral Choices, 4

U. PA. J. LAB.
rights values).

&

EMP. L. 479,491

(2002)

(contending values of Wagner Act are consistent with human
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By guaranteeing workers the freedom to engage in self-organization
and collective bargaining, Congress created an exception to the at-will
employment doctrine, which governs most employment relationships in
this country." 6 Under the traditional view of at-will employment, the
employee must obey all lawful commands of the employer."' The
doctrine allowing employers to hold captive audience meetings as a legal
prerogative is based on this notion of employee servility, inherent in the
at-will employment relationship." 8 It is ironic that employers can fire atwill employees for refusing to attend a captive audience meeting, the
purpose of which is to persuade employees to remain at-will employees,
who are subject to discharge at the whim of the employer."'
B.

DEFENSES OF CAPTIvE AUDIENCE MEETINGS ARE FLAWED

The premise that employer speech is important is union organizing
campaigns is based on several flawed concepts: that both sides have a
legal right to express their views; that employees need to hear the
employer's point of view; and that, as a candidate in the election, the
employer's speech is protected as political speech.
I. Employee Speech Versus Employer Speech
Employers and courts have defended the legality of captive audience
meetings as an attempt to encourage debate over the pros and cons of
unionization." The captive audience doctrine, however, explicitly allows
employers to ban discussion within meetings, and to restrict the speech of
pro-union workers. 2' Employers may legally fire employees for asking
questions about information presented by the employer.'22 The law gives
pro-union employees no right to counterbalance employers' anti-union
speeches. As the Eighth Circuit held in NLRB v. Prescott Industrial
Products Co., anti-union captive audience speeches are not forums in

i6. Id.
117. CHARLES MANLEY SMrr-, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 69 (1862).

i18. Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union RepresentationElections, and the FirstAmendment, I6
BERKELEY J. EMp. &LAB. L. 356, 421 (1995).
i 19. 1 LEX K. LARSON, UNJUSr DISMISSAL, RELEASE No. 36, § I.OI (MArnmEw BENDER 2002).
120. Id. at 382; see also Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in
Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE LJ. 2415, 2427 (2oo3) (arguing legislative history and

historical context of Section 8(c) show liberty at issue was employer's freedom to campaign against
unionization, not free speech for employers and employees).
121. Andrias, supranote 12o, at 244o.
122. NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 5oo F.2d 6, II (8th Cir. 1974) (upholding discharge for
insubordination of employee who attempted to ask a question of the employer following a captive
audience meeting)l Andrias, supra note 120, at 244o (citing J.P. Stevens & Co., 219 N.LR.B. 85o, 850
(1975)). The NLRB found the employee had been fired for engaging in protected activity and that
although exceeding the bounds of lawful conduct, he did not lose the protection of the Act. Prescott
Indus. Prod. Co. 205 N.L.R.B. 5I, 51-52 (i973). The 8th Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
order reinstating the fired employee. 5oo F.2d at 19.
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which workers must be treated as equals in dealing with management.' 23

Captive audience meetings are also defended on the grounds that
employees have a right to hear both sides of the issue." Employer
speech is endorsed as enhancing employees' freedom of choice by
contributing to the creation of a "marketplace of ideas."' 25 However,
employers have no obligation to allow union organizers access to
employees ,6 and pro-union employees can be silenced and fired for not
remaining silent."7 Judge Brandeis' famous remedy of "more speech" is
not applied to speech encouraging employees to exercise their rights.
Captive Audience Meetings Are Not Necessary for Employees to
Receive Information
Research shows that workers already know how their employers feel
about unions before campaigning begins. I"S In a study of 360 union
organizing campaigns, workers were asked how they felt their company
would respond to the issue of union representation. 29 Forty-two percent
of workers thought their employer would "make an all-out effort to
defeat the union"; another 21 percent thought their employer would "try
to persuade workers to oppose union representation."'30 Only 24 percent
of workers thought their3 employer would allow the employees to make
the choice on their own.' '
2.

A seminal study of thirty-one union elections during 1973 and 1974
found that employer campaigning combined with denial of union access
created an improper imbalance in opportunities for communication with
employees.'32 The Getman study, while arguing that employees are not
influenced by either the employer's or the union's campaign, admitted
that a powerful correlation existed between "campaign familiarity" and
attendance at meetings.'33 The study found that employers had an
inordinate advantage in organizing campaigns because they were
"substantially more successful in getting employees to attend meetings
than was the union."'" The study reported that 83 percent of employees

123. 500 F.2d 6, II (8th Cir. 1974) (citing NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 728 (8th Cir.
1972)).
124.

Story, supra note I18, at 383.

125.

Id.

NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO (NuTone/Avondale), 357 U.S. 357, 363
(1958) (holding employer has no obligation to allow the use of facilities for pro-union solicitation
although employer himself is violating no-solicitation rule in anti-union campaign).
126.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Andrias, supra note 120, at 2440.
Comstock & Fox, supra note 113, at 99.

Id.
Id.
Id.

132. JULIUs G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECnONs: LAW AND REALITY 143-57.

133. Id. at 156.
134. Id. at 92.
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attended company meetings, while only 36 percent attended union
meetings.'35 This disparity created an imbalance that the authors
recommended be redressed by requiring employers to allow the union to
hold meetings
on working time and premises, if the employer holds such
meetings. 36
3. The Employer is Not a Candidate
Another flawed concept underlying the doctrine of "employer free
speech" casts the employer as a "candidate" in the election. In Thomas v.
Collins,'37 the Supreme Court presupposed that employers and unions are
rival candidates in representation elections,' 38 construing employer
speech as political speech, entitled to protection. 39 Upon closer
examination, however, the differences between a political campaign and
an organizational campaign are apparent. First, employees voting in a
representation election choose whether to be represented for purposes of
collective bargaining by a particular union-the employer is not on the
ballot. Second, the First Amendment protection guaranteed to political
speech is premised on a democratic and "robust" approach to debate, in
which competing views are permitted "equal time."'" However, only the
employer is guaranteed the right to speak, while also being permitted to
exercise its economic power to prohibit employees from speaking in turn.
Finally, union campaigns are fundamentally different from political
campaigns in their outcome. When employees choose a union, the
employer is not ousted as a losing incumbent, but rather retains control
of its workplace. The union does not gain authority to set terms of
employment, but only a right to negotiate as the elected representative of
the employees. By protecting employer speech as "political" speech, the
courts have "cloaked a private corporate speaker with First Amendment
protection which, in turn, has used that protection to abridge the First
Amendment values and their exercise by employees."''4 ' This result is
particularly ironic because only the employees' interests are statutorily
protected by the NLRA, which gives employers no positive right to
influence employees' votes.
In draping employer anti-union speech in First Amendment finery,
the Board and the courts ignore the principle that freedom of speech is
not an absolute right, and cannot subjugate all other rights. First
Amendment doctrine allows for time, place, and manner restrictions of
135. Id. at 156.
136. Id. at 156-57.
137. 323 U.S. 5i6 (i945).
138. Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal
Labor Law,77 MINN. L. REv. 495,542 (1993).
139. See id. at 537-38.
140. Story, supra note 18, at 400.
141. Id. at 4oi.
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speech to further the aims of democracy. As the NLRA proclaims,
protecting employees' fights and promoting industrial equality are
democratic ideals. Regulating speech that threatens the realization of
those ideals advances the goals of the First Amendment.'"
C.

PROTECTION OF EMPLOYERS' RIGHTS AT A COST TO EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS

Concerned that the nation's labor laws were not adequately
protecting the rights of employees to organize,'43 the Secretaries of Labor
and Commerce established the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations (The Dunlop Commission) in 1993 to investigate
and recommend changes to existing labor law.'" The Commission
reported that the law protects employers' rights to an extent that allows
employers to campaign constantly against a union during an organizing
drive.'45 The Board and courts rigorously protect employers' speech,
property and managerial rights, ensuring that only the employer's view is
presented in the workplace.' While the exercise of the employer's right
to speak to its employees about unionization, to compel their attendance
at anti-union meetings, and to prevent union organizers from accessing
its property are all legal per se, taken together, they result in an
imbalance in the favor of the employer'47 that is inconsistent with the
policy of the NLRA.' 4 The Commission further found that the exercise
of these rights demonstrates the employer's power over the employee,
making the choice of unionization seem that much more costly to
employees than it might otherwise be perceived.' Through legal tactics,
employers can effectively defeat one of the main goals of the NLRA: to
provide employees with a free and uncoerced choice regarding whether
to be represented by a union."
IV.

CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETINGS SHOULD BE BANNED

A. EXTENSION OF PEERLESS PLYWOOD RULE
This Note proposes one reform to current U.S. labor law: banning
captive audience meetings by extending the existing rule of Peerless
Plywood to the entire pre-election time period. The Board's stated
rationale for limiting the Peerless Plywood prohibition of captive
audience meetings to the last twenty-four hours before an election is
Andias, supra note 120, at 2458.
143. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 54, at 5.
142.

144. Id. at i.
145. Id. at 77.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 92.
148. Id. at ioo.
I49. Id. at 92.
i5o. Id. at 91-92.
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unclear. According to the Board, captive audience speeches are only
harmful when made during the last twenty-four hours before an election:
[T]he real vice is in the last-minute character of the speech coupled
with the fact that it is made on company time whether delivered by the
employer or the union or both. Such a speech, because of its timing,
tends to create a mass psychology which overrides arguments made
through other campaign media and gives an unfair advantage to the
party, whether the employer or the union, who in this manner obtains
the last most telling word."
The Board's decision does not explain why this "mass psychology" is
not engendered by a "voluntary" meeting held on company premises
within the last twenty-four hours, or a captive audience meeting held at
other times prior to an election.
In both Peerless Plywood and Livingston Shirt, the Board claimed to
rely on its experience with conducting representation elections in
deciding that captive audience speeches held within the last twenty-four
hours before an election have an "unwholesome and unsettling effect""'
on employees. 53 For the eight years preceding the two cases, however,
the Board allowed employers to hold captive audience meetings without
distinguishing "last-minute" speeches from any other. No empirical
evidence could have existed comparing the effects of captive audience
meetings held prior to the last twenty-four hours before the election,
from the effects of those held within the last twenty-four hours, as the
Board had never delineated between them.
The reasoning of Livingston Shirt, Peerless' companion case, is
equally opaque as to the Peerless rule's rationale. In Livingston Shirt, the
Board referred not to "mass psychology," but to protecting employees
from: "last minute blandishments which [they] may feel compelled to
hear and which may becloud [their] judgment and interfere with [their]
thoughtful weighing of the issues involved.""M The Peerless rule,
however, does not prohibit an employer from giving a captive audience
speech to each employee, individually, while at his or her workstation,
within the last twenty-four hours before an election.' If the Peerless rule
is based on protecting employees from last minute arguments they may
feel compelled to hear, allowing individual captive meetings with
employees within the last twenty-four hours before an election defeats
the purpose. Individual captive meetings allow employers to becloud
i51. Peerless Plywood Co., io7 N.LR.B. 427,429 (i953).
152. Id.
153. Id.; Livingston Shirt Corp., IO7 N.LR.B. 400,408 (953).
154. Livingston Shirt Corp., io7 N.LR.B. 400,408 (1953).
155. Associated NM Producers, Inc., 237 N.LRB. 879, 88o (i078) (holding an employer did not
violate the rule of PeerlessPlywood when he, on the day of the union election, gave a short anti-union
speech to every employee while each was at his or her workstation, and to assembled employees in an
area where limited workspace precluded him from addressing them individually).
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employees' judgments and interfere with their weighing of the issues at
least as much as much as mass captive audience meetings, creating a
distinction without a difference. As Board Member Murdock wrote in his

dissent in Peerless Plywood:
The mass psychology which my colleagues agree is created by
employer speeches of this type, is not solely dependent upon the lastminute character of the employer's speech but comes, in fact, as a
result of the employer's exclusive use of a forum as highly charged with
significance and pressure for employees as is the place where they
work. This, the crux of the interference with a free election caused by
such employer speeches, is not alleviated in any manner by the lastminute moratorium proposed by the majority. 156
B.

BANNING CAPIIvE AUDIENCE MEETINGS

DOES NOT REQUIRE UNION

AccEss To EMPLOYER PREMISES
The proposal to ban captive audience meetings has been made in the
past, usually in the context of arguing for "equal access" to employees
for unions to present campaign speeches' or for a major overhaul of the
representation election process.', 8 Following the passage of the TaftHartley Act, the Board tried to require equal access to employees for
unions, holding that employers who held captive audience meetings were
required to allow union organizers an equal opportunity to communicate
with employees. 9 The courts consistently denied enforcement of these
Board orders, and declared that employers' property rights trump the
rights of employees' under the NLRA.' 60
In 1956, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox that
employers may bar union organizers from their property unless unions
have no other possible means to communicate with employees., 6' This

rule allows employers to deny unions access to employees, unless the

156. lO7 N.L.RIB. 427,432 (1953) (Murdock, Bd. Member, dissenting).
157. Labor Law Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 84IO, 95th Cong. (1977) (failed attempt to reform
NLRA; bill passed the house and was voted down in the Senate after filibuster by Senator Hatch);
Comment, Labor Law Reforn" The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB
Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 790-91 (1979) (proposing reform that requires
employers to grant unions opportunity to respond to captive audience meetings on employers' time
and premises).
158. Becker, supra note 139, at 585-94 (proposing changes to representation elections including
denying employers the right to be heard in representation cases and unfair labor practice cases arising
from election conduct, the right to raise questions concerning voter eligibility or unit determination,
and the right to appeal election results).
159. See e.g. Bonwit Teller, 96 N.LR.B. 6o8, 6II (195i) (finding employer's denial of union's
request to address employees on premises had same effect as discriminatorily applying no-solicitation
rule); In re Babcock & Wilcox, io9 N.L.R.B. 485, 494 (954) (finding employer's refusal to allow nonemployee union members to distribute literature in plant parking lot constituted an unreasonable
impediment to self-organization).
i6o. See discussion supra Part II.
I6I. 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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employees live at their workplace, such as in logging or mining camps.16 2
As the Court wrote in 1958: "the Taft-Hartley Act does not command
that labor organizations ... be protected in the use of every possible
means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are
of communication simply because the employer
entitled to use
63 a medium
is using it."'
Under the NLRA, employers cannot be required to allow union
organizers to solicit or distribute literature on company property. Given
the current state of the law, any labor law reform that would require
employers to allow a union representative to use employer facilities to
counteract employer anti-union captive audience meetings is unlikely to
be enforced.
Furthermore, even if unions were afforded "equal access" to
employees, on employer premises and time, the communicative impact of
employer speech and union speech would never be equal. The employee
is economically dependent on the employer, not on the union. The
employer can make promises and threats (whether legal or not) that it
has the power to make good on under any circumstances; the union can
only keep its promises if the employees elect it as a representative.
Whether the union wins or loses the election, the employer continues
signing the employees' paychecks every month. The economic reality of
at-will employment makes "equal access" an oxymoron when used to
describe union-held "captive audience" speeches.
C. FIRST

AMENDMENT CAPTIVE AUDIENCE
REGULATION OF EMPLOYER SPEECH

DOCTRINE

ALLOWS FOR

As Chief Justice Warren wrote in his concurrence and dissent in
NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO, "[e]mployees during
working hours are the classic captive audience."'6 First Amendment65
doctrine allows for regulation of speech directed at captive audiences,'
and should be invoked to prohibit employers' anti-union captive
audience meetings. The captive audience doctrine is based on the belief
that an individual, when captive, has a right not to hear speech that
outweighs the speaker's right to free expression.I 66 The doctrine is
premised in part on the right to choose what information one receives,

162. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (holding Babcock allows a union equal
access to employees "only where the location of the plant and the living quarters of the employees
place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them").
163. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO (NuTone/Avondale), 357 U.S. 357, 364
(1958).
164. Id. at 368 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
i65. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (98o).
i66. Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 85
(1990.
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and to make one's own choices based on that information.' 67 Forced
listening, by definition, removes decision-making authority from the
individual." In balancing the right to free speech with the right to choose
what one hears, courts consider the'burden the listener should bear in
avoiding the speech, such as walking away from a speaker or averting
one's eyes to written speech. '69 If an individual's choice not to hear
speech cannot be freely made, that burden should be found to be
unreasonable.'7" The greatest justification for regulating expression based
on the captive audience doctrine exists when the speech is highly
intrusive upon the right to choose not to listen, and the burden of
avoiding such speech is extreme."'
Following this doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that radio
listeners receiving broadcasts in their homes are captive audiences, and
so the FCC can prohibit certain types of offensive speech.'72 Yet workers,

who can be fired for refusing to attend an employer's anti-union captive
audience meeting, are not considered so greatly burdened as to warrant
governmental restriction of employer speech. Some courts have
recognized the "captive" nature of the employees' at the workplace in
cases where employers, and even third parties, have targeted workers
with objectionable speech.'" If speech directed at employees during
working time can be regulated in some contexts, then employer speech
may be restricted if that speech is intended to deter employees from
exercising their statutorily protected rights.'74
D.

OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND SOME STATES ALREADY
CAPTIvE AUDIENCE MEETINGS

BAN

The United States is unique among industrialized democracies in not
restricting employers' behavior in actively opposing their employees'
decision to unionize.75 The United States has refused to ratify
International Labor Organization Convention 87, which requires
member states to "take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure
' ' 76
that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organize.
167. Id. at io8-o9.
i68. Id. at to9.
I69. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
170. Strauss, supra note 166, at i o.
171. Id. at 120.
172. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-49 (1978).
173. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. i99i) (holding
female employees were captive audience to speech creating hostile work environment); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 5o3 F. Supp. 383, 402 (E.D. Penn. i98o) (holding employees at jobsite were
captive audience as only measure they could take to avoid speech was to quit their jobs).
174. For example, the First Amendment might not protect an employer's captive audience speech
that attempted to persuade employees not to vote in a presidential election.
175. Comstock & Fox, supra note 113, at 9o.
176. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, adopted July 9,
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The U.S. government was urged by the U.S. Council for International
Business not to sign the convention because it had been interpreted as
foreclosing any employer interference with organizing rights, such as
employer "free speech" under Section 8(c) of the NLRA.' 7
The Canadian courts cited the experience of U.S. employees who
attempt to unionize and are defeated by intense employer resistance as
support for restricting employer speech during union organizing
campaigns.' 8 A 1996 decision noted the long-standing policy of Canadian
Labour Boards that employers are not allowed to engage in anti-union
political-style campaigns in an effort to prevent a union from being
chosen by their employees.'79 The B.C. Labour Board recognized that the
economic dependence and vulnerability of employees underlies the need
to protect employees' rights, particularly during a union organizing
campaign.' ° According to the B.C. Labour Board, the Canadian
government has made a statutory choice to restrict employer speech in
favor of ensuring employees' freedom of association.'8 '
In the United States, labor laws in individual states could provide
more protection for employees' rights."2 The NLRA, as federal law, may
preempt states from recalibrating the "rules of engagement" established
between employers and unions in the context of collective bargaining,
including what types of picketing or strike activity are legal." 3 However,
the NLRA might not preempt states from providing employees greater
protection from employers in organizing campaigns,. particularly because
the NLRA does not grant any affirmative rights to employers to use their
economic power against employees.' 8 Federal labor law could be viewed
as establishing minimum standards of workers' rights, to which states

1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, 20; ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards, C87 Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, at httpJ/www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/convdispi.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).
177. James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations Law: A
Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association,3 EMPLOYEE Rrs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 65, 87 (1999) (citing
Edward E. Potter, Freedom of Association, The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining: The
Impact on US. Law and Practiceof Ratificationof ILO Conventions No. 87 & No. 98,44 (1984)).
178. COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, NORTH AMERIcAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION,

CoMPARATIvE GUIDES TO LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAws IN NORTH AMERICA: LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN

NoiRT AMERICA 76 (200O), availableat http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/study2_canada.pdf (last visited
Aug. 12, 2004).
179. Id. at 75 (citing Re Cardinal Transportation B.C. Inc., [1996] 34 C.L.R1B.R. (2d) i).
i8o. Id.
181. Id. at 76.
182- See Cynthia L Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 1527,
1576-79 (2002) (arguing that federal labor law does not preempt states from granting workers greater
protection in organizing campaigns, free from employer retaliation).
I83. Id. at 1577 n.227 (citing Michael Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Presumptions:State Law
FacilitatingUnionization,7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 357 (1990)).
184. Id. at 1578.
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85
could add, making the NLRA a "floor" but not a "ceiling.'
Under this scheme, individual states may determine that captive
audience meetings have no place in private sector organizing campaigns.
Some states have already banned employer anti-union captive audience
meetings in the public sector.' 86 The Ohio State Employment Relations
Board has found the holding of captive audience meetings to be a per se
violation of the Ohio labor relations statute, depriving employees of a
free and untrammeled election 87
environment, and requiring the state
labor board to set aside elections.'
Other industrialized nations and individual states recognize that
captive audience meetings are antithetical to the protection of
employees' rights. Congress, however, has not acted upon the apparent
conflict between protecting "employer free speech" and protecting
workers' freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing.
CONCLUSION

The concept of employer held captive audience meetings as a
legitimate expression of employer "free speech" cannot be squared with
the democratic ideals embodied in the National Labor Relations Act.
Imagine you are a worker, forced by your employer to assemble with
your co-workers and be told that you should not exercise your rights to
obtain equal bargaining terms with management, or join a labor union;
that you should not desire more input regarding your working
conditions; or resist the notion of servility that pervades the at-will
employment relationship; that you should not have more power in the
workplace; should not bargain collectively to improve wages and terms
of employment; should not vote for the union.
Employees receive this message and understand that voting for the
union is dangerous if they want to keep their jobs. Captive audience
meetings are pervasive because they are effective, and because they are
legal. Banning captive audience meetings does not require a sea change
in national labor policy or law. The Peerless Plywood rule, which
recognizes the danger of captive audience meetings, could be extended
to cover the entire pre-election time period. First Amendment captive
audience doctrine provides for restriction of coercive speech when the
listener has no chance to escape such speech. Workers being told, by
those who wield economic power over them, not to enjoy a statutorily
protected, universally recognized human right are a captive audience,
185. Id at 1578-79.
i86. Douglas E. Ray et al., Regulating Union Representation Election Campaign Tactics: A
Comparative Study of Privateand PublicSector Approaches, 66 NEB. L REv. 532, 554-55 (1987).
187. Hamilton County Welfare Dept., 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. 3036 (1986).
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who require protection. For when could a listener have more of a burden
in resisting such speech than a worker at work, whose only recourse is to
quit the job? As most industrialized democracies, and some states,
recognize, captive audience meetings constitute impermissible employer
coercion in employees' exercise of their right of self-organization and
should be banned in private sector union organizing campaigns.
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